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SARA ELIZABETH JENSEN*

Policy Tools for Wildland Fire
Management: Principles, Incentives,
and ConflictsABSTRACT
Public perception of afire "crisis" in the United States makes fire
management a priorityfor both land managers and policy makers.
Land managers focus on three major methods for resolving the
current fuels build up problem: mechanicalfuels treatment, the
use of prescribedand naturally ignitedfire, andfire suppression.
Public policies create incentives for different fire management
strategies, which encourage or discourage the use of these three
management objectives. This analysisfinds conflicts in fire policy
and management practices to be relatively few and minor.
Conflicts generally result from the inherent complexity of fireprone ecosystems, which requires some flexibility in policy
implementation and interpretation.The absence of reliabledata to
either support or deny the claims that conflicting policies,
excessive litigation, or burdensome procedures are thwarting
federal attempts to bring the fue/fire crisis under control
suggests that sweeping policy changes would be ill advised at this
time.
I. INTRODUCTION
Researchers, politicians, and land managers have described a
wildland fire "crisis" in the United States during the late twentieth and
early twenty-first centuries. Decades of fire suppression in the west,
primarily on federal lands, have led to a build up of fuels that, combined
with an ever-expanding wildland urban interface,1 result in economically
* Jensen is an Assistant Staff Scientist at the University of Arizona's Institute for the
Study of Planet Earth. She holds an MS in Renewable Natural Resource Studies from the
University of Arizona.
This project has been funded by the Environmental Protection Agency's Science to
Achieve Results (STAR) program under grant number R-82873201-0.
1. The 2001 Review and Update of the 1995 Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy
defined the Wildland Urban Interface as
the line, area, or zone where structures and other human development
meet or intermingle with undeveloped wildland or vegetative fuels....
The...[i]nterface has become a major fire problem that will escalate as the
nation moves into the 21st Century. People continue to move from urban
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and ecologically disastrous wildfires. In addition, significant fires
(especially in the 2000 and 2002 fire seasons) and an expanding popular
awareness of the resulting property damage have led the general public
to become more attentive to fire issues and policy changes. It is now clear
that the effective management of fire regimes will be a major challenge
for land managers and policy makers for the foreseeable future.
Because of our new understanding of twentieth century forest
management practices, priority is now generally given to minimizing fire
risk with an emphasis on managing fire through fuel treatments rather
than complete fire exclusion or suppression. Land managers have
focused on two major methods for resolving the current fuels problem,
namely mechanical fuels management (usually in the form of forest
thinning) and the use of prescribed and naturally ignited fire ("wildland
fire use") to restore a fire regime closer to historical pre-colonial
conditions. For example, managers will aim to restore lower-elevation
ponderosa pine forests to the high-frequency/low-intensity fire regimes
that are widely believed to have existed before European settlement.
However, fire suppression remains a high priority and a major activity
for land management agencies at all levels of government, especially in
the western United States.
Recent policy debates in the United States suggest that existing
environmental policies often conflict with the effective use of these three
fire management strategies (thinning, fire use, and suppression). Public
dialogue, especially among agency leaders, has tended to simplify the
interactions between fire management and public policy. Mechanical
fuels treatment is often treated in public debate as a virtual panacea for
restoring historical fire regimes, while federal environmental policies
used to accomplish this goal are believed to delay or prevent thinning
activities in sensitive areas and are often described as "unnecessary
regulatory obstacles," 2 "layers of unnecessary red tape and procedural
delay," 3 or "burdensome regulations." 4 A 2002 U.S. Department of
to wildland areas. They give little thought to the wildfire hazard, and
bring with them their expectations for continuation of urban emergency
services.
U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR ET AL., REVIEW AND UPDATE OF THE 1995 FEDERAL WILDLAND FIRE
MANAGEMENT POLICY 3 (2001), http://www.nifc.gov/fire-policy/history/index.htm
(follow "Chapter 1" hyperlink) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR ET AL., 2001 FIRE POLICY
UPDATE].

2. Joint Counterpart Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation Regulations, 68
Fed. Reg. 33,806, 33,806 (June 5, 2003) (describing rationale for proposed rule to be codified
at 50 C.F.R. 402.30-402.34).
3. U.S. Dep't of Agric. et al., Press Release No. 0177.03, Cabinet Officials Report
Progress on President Bush's Healthy Forests Initiative (May 30, 2003), available at http://
www.doi.gov/news/030530a.htm.
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Agriculture (USDA) Forest Service report titled "The Process Predicament" contends, "Unfortunately, the Forest Service operates within a
statutory, regulatory, and administrative framework that has kept the
agency from effectively addressing rapid declines in forest health." 5
Conflicts between public policy and fire management activities
do exist. For example, our scientific understanding of wildland fire and
fire regimes is evolving rapidly, and existing policies are not always
sufficiently informed by this knowledge. Still, a much more
comprehensive and accurate picture of fire-policy interactions is needed
so that these conflicts can be resolved without seriously undermining
otherwise functional policy. No single kind of fire management strategy
will prevent all severe fires, restore all ecosystems to pre-colonial
conditions, or halt the destruction of private property. Thus, it is
important to explicitly examine the incentives and disincentives that
different policies create with respect to wildland fire management.
The goal of this article is to untangle the complex interactions of
policy and fire management. Policies relevant to fire management
include not only the legislative, regulatory, and other non-legislative
policy documents that guide fire management itself, but also the
environmental regulatory policies that more broadly govern federal land
management and environmental protection. Scientific knowledge on the
role of fire in natural and anthropogenic landscapes is gradually being
accepted as a guiding force for fire management. Thus, the first objective
of this study is to compare the mandates of science with those of policy
with respect to fire management, and the second objective is to find and
describe any inherent conflicts within or among these relevant policies.
As a result, this study is essentially a qualitative version of
classical content analysis. 6 It is based on the idea that different policy
tools create incentives for different fire management practices and that
these incentives can be compared to show inherent conflicts among
policies, scientific knowledge, and management. Following a review of
fire management practices, the policies listed in Figure 1 and their
implementing regulations (where applicable) were read closely with
their applications to wildland fire and incentives for fire management.

4. Gail A. Norton & Ann M. Veneman, Op-Ed, Cut the Red Tape, Restore Our
Forests, http://www.fs.fed.us/projects/hfi/news/nortonvenemanoped.pdf.
5. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. FOREST SERV., THE PROCESS PREDICAMENT: How STATUTORY,
REGULATORY, AND ADMINISTRATIVE FACTORS AFFECT NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 5

(2002), http://www.fs.fed.us/projects/documents/Process-Predicament.pdf.
6. See generally C.W. Roberts, Content Analysis, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 2697-702 (N.J. Smelser & P.B. Baltes eds., 2001).
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Figure 1: Key Points of Federal Fire Management Policies 7
Although the policies directing federal wildland fire management
focus on different priorities and are at times even directly
contradictory, the following key points provide a concise synthesis of
the goals outlined for fire management agencies:
* Protecting firefighter and public safety is the first priority in
fire management;
* Fire management practices should aim to restore landscapes
and rebuild communities, with particular focus placed on
hazardous fuel reduction and on returning fire to fire-adapted
ecosystems;
* Fire management practices should be based on existing land
and resource management plans, economic viability, best
available science, and principles of sound risk management;
* Public health and environmental quality should be considered
in fire management planning; and
* Cooperation and coordination among numerous groups,
including federal agencies; state, tribal, and local
governments; international partners; and communities are the
keys to effective fire management.
II. REVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND POLICY TOOLS
Kolstad argues, "There are two basic questions in environmental
policy: 'What is the right balance between environmental protection and
use?' and 'How do we induce economic agents to use the environment in
a fashion that we have determined is desirable?' ' 8 A wide variety of
policy tools such as legislative documents like the Endangered Species
Act, regulations and other administrative guidelines for implementation,
court decisions that interpret and reinterpret laws, and federal and state
agency programs and guidelines that actually implement and enforce
policies are used to answer these questions and to manipulate the
balance between environmental protection and use. Schneider and
Ingram define policy tools as "the elements in policy design that cause
agents or targets to do something they would not otherwise do with the
intention of modifying behavior to solve public problems or attain policy
goals." 9 They also develop a typology of policy tools, including authority
7. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR ET AL., 2001 FIRE POLICY UPDATE, supra note 1, at 15-16.
8.
CHARLES KOLSTAD, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 28 (2000).
9. ANNE LARASON SCHNEIDER & HELEN INGRAM, POLICY DESIGN FOR DEMOCRACY 93
(1997).

Fall 2006]

WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT

tools (those that rely exclusively on authority without the threat of
sanctions), inducements and sanctions, capacity-building tools, hortatory
tools, and learning tools. Federal environmental policy currently relies
heavily on inducements, sanctions, and authority tools, although
capacity-building tools are becoming more common. 10
Inducements and sanctions can be direct or indirect. One
important way in which environmental policies attempt to manipulate
the balance between protection and use is through the application of
subsidies. 1 The Healthy Forests Restoration Act provides direct
subsidies for the development of industries that use what was previously
12
considered unmarketable biomass from mechanical thinning projects.
13
Indirect subsidies also exist in the form of environmental externalities.
For example, by devoting substantial public funding to fire suppression,
the federal government indirectly subsidizes development in the
wildland-urban interface. Much of the inherent cost of building in a fireprone wildland urban interface environment is borne by federal
4
taxpayers rather than by the developers or residents.
Environmental policies and policy tools often provide incentives
for specific management activities while also addressing other goals and
values. Policy researchers are increasingly addressing the ways in which
policy can foster or suppress citizen participation in the political process.
Lowi suggests that different kinds of policies (which he defines as
distributive, regulatory, and redistributive) make individuals and
groups (versus political elites) more likely to involve themselves in the
political process.' 5 Indeed, it is clear from everyday observation that
different policies produce different patterns of democratic participation.
10. Id. at 93-95.
11. Myers and Kent define a "subsidy" as "a form of government support extended to
an economic sector (or institution, business, or individual), generally with the aim of
promoting an activity that the government considers beneficial to the economy overall and
to society at large." NORMAN MYERS & JENNIFER KENT, PERVERSE SUBSIDIES: How TAx
DOLLARS CAN UNDERCUT THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMY 5 (2001).

12. 16 U.S.C. § 6531 (2000).
13. An externality occurs when "one person's or firm's actions affect another entity
without permission." KOLSTAD, supra note 8, at 90.
14. Other inducements and sanctions are less explicitly economic. A policy can create
an incentive for a particular management activity by simplifying the administrative or
bureaucratic process that managers must follow to carry it out. Conversely, a policy can
provide a strong disincentive by creating a complex network of rules and regulations for
managers to navigate. Of course, an even stronger disincentive is created when a
management activity is explicitly forbidden, especially when accompanied by the threat of
economic or other sanctions.
15. See Theodore J. Lowi, American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political
Theory, 16 WORLD POL. 677, 690-92 (1964); see also Theodore J. Lowi, Four Systems ofPolicy,
Politics,and Choice, 32 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 298, 298-310 (1972).
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Schneider and Ingram argue, "Some policy designs encourage active
responsible citizenship by providing arenas for participation and
expectations that citizens will become involved." 16 Conversely, "[o]ther
designs obfuscate and complicate, leaving the response to policy largely
in the hands of lawyers, scientists, and highly skilled policy
entrepreneurs."'17
Similarly, policy tools can be used to promote broad types of
management strategies. For example, as the dominance of federal
agencies in wildland fire management reaches the end of its first century,
calls for a cohesive, comprehensive, and, above all, science-based policy
are increasingly frequent. Franklin and Agee state, "Although there is a
large base of scientific knowledge available for developing a national
forest fire policy, it is largely ignored in current policy proposals. " 18 They
suggest that such a policy should be based on scientific principles and
data, including existing knowledge about historical fire cycles,
anthropogenic influences on fuel regimes, and basic forest ecology along
with complex issues such as the diversity of fire regimes in different
ecosystems and the need for long-term fire planning. 19 Similarly,
Dellasala and others argue that "[s]cientific knowledge has a central role
in both defining and resolving issues related to fire and fuels
management," 20 and that "fire policy must be shaped by an emphasis on
fundamental approaches to restoring or maintaining ecological integrity,
[and] a real understanding of the nature and extent of all the risks to
21
both humans and wildlands."
Franklin and Agee also imply the need for interagency cooperation and communication in fire management. 22 This goal is mentioned in
nearly every recent fire policy document, but incentives for interagency
cooperation are rarely explicitly stated. Unfortunately, at the present
time there is little agreement on the characteristics of policies that
encourage science-based management and interagency cooperation.
Values such as citizen participation, science-based management,
and interagency cooperation are widely recognized as laudable goals in
environmental and fire management. The development of these goals
through federal fire policies is outlined in part III, and the incentives and
16. SCHNEIDER & INGRAM, supra note 9, at 80-81.
17. Id. at 81.
18. Jerry F. Franklin & James K. Agee, Forginga Science-Based National ForestFire Policy,
ISSUES IN SCI.& TECH., Fall 2003, at 59, 63.
19. Id. at 60.
20. Dominick A. Dellasala et al., Beyond Smoke and Mirrors:A Synthesis of Fire Policy and
Science, 18 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 976, 979 (2004).
21. Id. at 984.
22. See Franklin & Agee, supra note 18, at 59-60.
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disincentives that are created by specific environmental policies are
examined more closely in part V.
III. FEDERAL FIRE POLICIES: GOALS AND PRIORITIES
Fire management activities on federal lands are guided by a
number of non-legislative policy documents (statements and initiatives)
that have often followed severe fire seasons, when well-publicized large
fires focused governmental and popular attention on wildland fire as a
worrisome hazard. Perhaps as a result, the fire management policy
landscape is not particularly cohesive. Documents are sometimes
redundant and often contradictory, which presents a formidable
challenge to resource managers in fire-prone ecosystems.
One such severe fire season occurred in 1994, when 34 lives were
lost and more than 4.7 million acres burned.23 A working group was
convened by Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman and Secretary of the
Interior Bruce Babbitt to develop a common approach to wildland fire
for the federal land management agencies. 24 The resulting document was
the Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy and Program (or Federal
Fire Policy), which was intended to guide federal agencies in fire
management planning. 25 It outlined guiding principles, including the
primacy of firefighter safety, the role of fire as a necessary and
fundamental ecological process, and the need to make fire protection
economically viable. Fire preparedness was emphasized over the more
costly and dangerous suppression activities (discussed below in part IV),
as was the need to reduce heavy fuel loads. As a result of the Federal Fire
Policy, every burnable federal area was to have a fire management plan
(FMP) outlining both the fire use and fire suppression activities to take
place. 26 FMPs were required to be consistent with firefighter and public
safety, values to be protected, and public health issues and to address all
potential wildland fire occurrences and include the full range of fire
management actions. 27 Although the policy was impressive in its
attention to a variety of fire management strategies, its recognition of
23. Nat'l Interagency Fire Ctr., Wildland Fire Statistics, http://www.nifc.gov/stats/
index.html (for acres burned, follow "Wildland Fires and Acres (1960-1994)" hyperlink);
(for lives lost, http://www.nifc.gov/reports/year.pdf) (last visited Jan. 14, 2007).
24. Nat'l Fire & Aviation Executive Bd. Pol'y Directives Task Group, Federal Wildland
Fire Management Policy & Program Review, http://www.nifc.gov/fire-policy/
95policy.htm (presenting "Federal Wildland Fire Policy" as Memorandum to Acting Dir.,
Bureau of Land Mgmt. et al. (Dec. 20, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 Federal Fire Policy].
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 6.
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fire's vital role, and its attempts to standardize fire-planning processes
while allowing for variability across different fire-prone ecosystems, the
policy was not fully implemented. Due to a lack of funding, interagency
cooperation, and oversight, many federally managed areas had yet to
complete satisfactory FMPs by 2001. 28
Following the highly publicized escape of the Cerro Grande
Prescribed Fire in May 2000, the 1995 working group reassembled at the
Secretaries' request to conduct an analysis, review, and revision of the
Federal Fire Policy. The outcome was the 2001 "review and update"
document that replaced the 1995 Federal Wildland Fire Policy. 29
Although the guiding principles of the policy changed very little, the
working group found that implementation was inconsistent and
incomplete and that the failure of federal agencies to fully implement the
1995 policy had significantly undermined its effectiveness.3 0
Later, extensive fires continued throughout 2000, with a total of
122,827 wildfires and more than 8.4 million acres burned by the end of
the season.31 President Clinton asked Secretaries Babbitt and Glickman to
prepare an overarching analysis of the wildland fire situation.32 This
report became the basis for the National Fire Plan, which attempted to
clarify priorities for fire management.3 3 Much of the National Fire Plan is
devoted to allocating funding to various fire management activities.
Annual budget appropriations for fire management in the USDA Forest
Service and the Department of the Interior increased from $1.6 billion in
fiscal year 2000 (the year before the National Fire Plan was initiated) to
$2.2 to $3.2 billion for the years 2001 through 2005, with roughly half of
that budget devoted to suppression activities, including fire
preparedness and assistance to state and local fire departments. 34 Other
budgeted activities included research, hazardous fuel reduction projects,

28.

U.S. DEI"T OF INTERIOR ET AL., 2001 FIRE POLICY UPDATE, supra note 1, at 12.

29.
30.
31.

See generally id.
Id. at 10 (follow "Chapter 2" hyperlink).
Nat'l Interagency Fire Ctr., supra note 23.

32. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR & U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., MANAGING THE IMPACT OF
WILDFIRE ON COMMUNITIES AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT IN
RESPONSE TO THE WILDFIRES OF 2000, at 1 (2000), http://www.fireplan.gov/reports/8-20-

en.pdf.
33. Id.; U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR ET AL., 2001 FIRE POLICY UPDATE, supra note 1.
34. In FY 2001 and FY 2002, the total funds appropriated for wildland fire management
programs were just under $2.9 billion and $2.3 billion, respectively. Estimates for later
years are projected in the National Fire Plan. The numbers provided here include
emergency appropriations for suppression efforts, which range from $320 million in 2002
to $1.1 billion in 2003. The Wilderness Society, The Federal Wildland Fire Budget: Let's
Prepare, Not Just React (Mar. 2004), http://www.wildemess.org/Library/Documents/
WildlandFireBudget.cfm.
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and burned area rehabilitation.35 Thus, funding committed through the
National Fire Plan contradicts the priorities of the 1995 Federal Wildland
Fire Policy by significantly increasing fire suppression funding relative
to funding for other fire-management strategies. The document's
language is also internally quite contradictory, emphasizing both the
importance of aggressive fire suppression and the idea that "problem"
fires are the result of suppression activities.
In 2001, based on the ideas of the National Fire Plan, an
implementation plan was developed by a broad cross-section of
governmental and non-governmental stakeholders and was generally
referred to as the "10-Year Comprehensive Strategy." 36 The plan aimed
to address the National Fire Plan priority of community involvement by
designing a proactive, collaborative, and community-based approach to
reducing wildland fires, 3 7 as opposed to the more agency-centered
approach, like the Federal Wildland Fire Policy. However, the first listed
goal of the Comprehensive Strategy is to "improve suppression and
prevention," emphasizing again the contradiction between the priorities
38
of the National Fire Plan and the Federal Wildland Fire Policy.
In August of 2002, near the end of a season in which extreme
drought conditions predominated throughout the West, nearly seven
million acres burned, and an estimated $1.6 billion were spent on federal
fire suppression efforts, 39 President George W. Bush and agency leaders
35. W. GOVERNORS' ASS'N, A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH FOR REDUCING WILDLAND
FIRE RISKS TO COMMUNITIES: 10-YEAR COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY 7, 9, 10 (2001) [hereinafter

W. GOVERNORS' ASS'N, 10-YEAR STRATEGY], http://www.westgov.org/wga/initiatives/fire
/final-firejrpt.pdf.
36. W. GOVERNORS' ASS'N, A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH FOR REDUCING WILDLAND
FIRE RISKS TO COMMUNITIES: 10-YEAR COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

(2001) [hereinafter W. GOVERNORS' ASS'N, 10-YEAR PLAN], http://www.fireplan.gov/
reports/7-19-en.pdf. The report was prepared primarily by the Western Governors'
Association (WGA) with support from the departments of Agriculture and the Interior. The
WGA also cited input from individuals at The Wilderness Society, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, USDA Forest Service, American Forest Resource Council, National
Cattleman's Beef Association, U.S. Geological Survey, Oregon Governor's Office, New
Mexico Department of Forestry, Wisconsin State Forester's Office, U.S. Bureau of Land
Management, Utah Governor's Office, National Association of Counties, National
Association of State Foresters, Texas State Forester, Communities Committee of the 7th
American Forest Congress, Western Council of State Foresters, National Association of
State Foresters, Idaho Governor's Office, Intertribal Timber Council, State of Wyoming,
National Interagency Fire Center, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Marine
Fisheries Service. Id. app. C, at 25-27.
37. W. GOVERNORS' ASS'N, 10-YEAR STRATEGY, supra note 35, at 1-2.
38. Id. at l.
39. Nat'l Interagency Fire Ctr., supra note 23 (for acres burned, follow "Wildland Fires
and Acres (1960-2005)" hyperlink; for costs, follow "Wildland Fire Suppression Costs"
hyperlink).
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unveiled the Healthy Forests Initiative, generally an initiative for
wildfire prevention and stronger communities. 40 The initiative
emphasized the extreme, "catastrophic" nature of recent wildland fires
and proposed that "[e]nhanced measures are needed to restore forest
41
and rangeland health to reduce the risk of these catastrophic wildfires."
The initiative strongly promoted the use of mechanical thinning and
prescribed burning to reduce hazardous fuels. Throughout the
document, fuel reduction was explicitly advocated not only as a means
of protecting communities from wildfire but also as a necessary tool for
restoring ecosystem health.
Another recurring theme in the Healthy Forests dialogue was
the idea of an "analysis paralysis": in other words, the idea that the
extensive procedural requirements of environmental and land
management laws cause dangerous delays in hazardous-fuels reduction.
This idea appears to have been developed in the unpublished Thomas
report, which was drafted in 1995 to review the relationship between
such laws and national forest management practices but was never
released. 42 In a 2002 USDA Forest Service report, the concept was
described as a "process predicament" and was expanded to argue that
the public and environmental groups were further delaying muchneeded projects through the excessive use of administrative appeals and
43
litigation.
A series of policy and regulation changes associated with the
Healthy Forests Initiative have stressed these issues. Primary among
these is the Healthy Forests Restoration Act, passed in 2003, aimed
primarily to streamline the decision-making process for certain types of
federal hazardous-fuels reduction projects and limit the potential for
administrative appeals. 44 The Act also established grants for innovations
in biomass use, promoted research and planning around insect
infestations, and established a program for the protection of rare forest
45
types on private lands.

40. George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Forest Health and Preservation
(Aug. 22, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08/2002
0822-3.html.
41. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, HEALTHY FOREST: AN INITIATIVE FOR WILDFIRE PREVENTION AND STRONGER COMMuNITIEs 2 (2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/healthy

forests/HealthyForestsv2.pdf.
42. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., supra note 5, at 13.
43. Id. at 27-29.
44. Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-148, 117 Stat. 1887 (16
U.S.C.A. §§ 6501-6591 (Supp. 2006)).
45. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 6531-6591.
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Two important rule changes also established alternative, less
demanding processes through which some hazardous-fuels reduction
projects could comply with the Endangered Species Act (ESA) 46 and the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).47 The stated goal of these
changes was to solve the "process predicament" for fire management
activities that agencies see as both crucial and relatively benign.
In 2003, ESA joint counterpart regulations were developed for
the activities covered by the National Fire Plan (generally mechanical
48
fuel reduction and prescribed fire projects on public lands).A
These
regulations establish an alternative process through which the federal
agency proposing a project is allowed to determine whether or not listed
species' survival will be jeopardized without any formal or informal
consultation with the agencies normally responsible for implementing
the ESA. 49 Instead, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service or National Marine
Fisheries Service will provide any "training, oversight, and monitoring"
50
needed for agencies to make their own determination.
Also in 2003, the USDA Forest Service and the Department of the
Interior announced a change to NEPA implementation rules that listed
some fire management activities as "categorical exclusions": categories
of actions that do not normally significantly affect the human
environment and are therefore effectively exempted from the NEPA
process. 51 This categorical exclusion encompasses many of the smaller
hazardous fuel reduction and post-fire rehabilitation projects on public
lands.
Together, these policies represent a relatively comprehensive
picture of the bipartisan, multi-stakeholder goals and priorities of federal
fire management. The key points common to all of these policies are
summarized in Figure 1.52 However, as this analysis has described,
substantial contradictions exist among them. Franklin and Agee note
that the United States has "no comprehensive policy to deal with fire and
fuels and few indications that such a policy is in development." 53
46. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (2000).
48. Joint Counterpart Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation Regulations, 68
Fed. Reg. 68,254-65 (Dec. 8, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 402.30-402.34).
49. Id. at 68,257.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. The more recent Healthy Forests Initiative and Healthy Forests Restoration Act are
not considered in this analysis because those documents make direct and exclusive
reference to the goals and priorities of the National Fire Plan and 10-Year Comprehensive
Strategy and are implemented primarily through changes to existing environmental
policies.
53. Franklin & Agee, supra note 18, at 59.
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Instead, a series of disconnected and contradictory policies add
complexity to fire policy and management. Many policy researchers
suggest that unnecessarily complex and confusing policies tend to
discourage public involvement in the decision-making process.% Current
problems with fire management, as described by resource managers,
agency leaders, and decision makers alike, suggest that the same
problem currently exists throughout the fire management process.
IV. A SCIENCE-BASED PERSPECTIVE OF FIRE MANAGEMENT
PRACTICES
Wildland fire behavior is determined by several factors,
including climate, weather conditions, and fuel type (distribution and
abundance). The premise behind mechanical and fire treatments (often
collectively referred to as hazardous-fuels reduction projects) is that
humans can best influence the likelihood of ignition and the behavior of
fires by modifying fuels. For a fire to ignite and burn, fine fuel moisture
must be less than 30 to 40 percent and abundant amounts of fuels must
be available. 55 A rough figure for use in prescribed fires is 670 to 1120
kg/ha of fine fuels less than 3 mm in diameter, although wildfires are
known to carry with as little as 340 kg/ha of fine fuels.5 6 However, the
chemical and structural properties of fuels also greatly influence a fire's
behavior. Particularly abundant, dense, or combustible fuels result in
fires that are more intense and are more likely to show extreme
57
behaviors, such as spotting, firewhirls, crowning, and long, fast runs.
Intense fires can threaten species and landscapes that are better adapted
to slow-burning, low-intensity fires, such as some ponderosa pine
forests, and extreme fire behavior can make cultural resources and
developed areas more difficult to protect. Heavy surface fuels, such as
thick needle layers, can result in long-burning, low intensity fires, while
dry grasses are consumed very quickly. Understory shrubs and small
58
trees can act as ladders, carrying surface fires into the crowns of trees.
54. See, e.g., HANNA CORTNER & MARGARET MOOTE, THE POLITICS OF ECOSYSTEM
MANAGEMENT 19 (1999); SCHNEIDER & INGRAM, supra note 9, at 81.

55. Guy R. McPherson & Jake F. Weltzin, Disturbance and Climate Change in United
States/Mexico Borderland Plant Communities: A State-of-the-Knowledge Review 6 (U.S. Dep't of
Agric., Forest Serv., Rocky Mtn. Res. Station, Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-50, 2000).
56. Robert L. Wink & Henry A. Wright, Effects of Fire on an Ashe Juniper Community, 26
J. RANGE MGMT. 326-29 (1973); HENRY A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR W. BAILEY, FIRE ECOLOGY:
UNITED STATES AND SOUTHERN CANADA 389 (1982).
57. STEPHEN J. PYNE ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO WILDLAND FIRE 68 (1996).

58.

For a description of fire behavior, see U.S. DEl"T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERV., ROCKY

MTN. RES. STATION, SCIENCE BASIS FOR CHANGING FOREST STRUCTURE TO MODIFY WILDFIRE

BEHAVIOR AND SEVERITY 12-17 (Russell Graham et al., tech. eds., Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-
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The most common strategies for managing wildland fire are
mechanical treatments, 59 controlled fire treatments (prescribed and
natural-ignition "wildland fire use" fires), and direct suppression of
fires. Each management tool has unique benefits and risks. Because
many environmental and land management policies tend to favor or
discourage certain kinds of management, an understanding of their
relative values is crucial to the analysis of policy incentives.
Mechanical Treatments
Mechanical treatments aim to prevent specific kinds of fire
behavior (most commonly crowning and other extreme fire behaviors)
by altering the abundance, cover, or structure of fuels. 6° The most
common treatment is thinning, in which certain trees are removed to
improve the quality of the remaining stand. 61 Usually, thinning
treatments remove small-diameter trees (commonly those less than nine
inches diameter breast height) to favor a lower density of large trees over
a higher density of small ones. However, thinning also may be used to
open the crown by removing larger trees ("high" or "crown" thinning),
or trees may be removed without regard for size, quality, or species to
achieve a specified level of spacing. 62 Other treatments may include the
removal of understory shrubs and branches to prevent the accumulation
of "ladder" fuels (described above) or the removal of needle litter from
around the bases of trees or structures to prevent their ignition. A USDA
Forest Service review of fuels modification states, "The most effective
strategy for reducing crown fire occurrence and severity is to (1) reduce
surface fuels, (2) increase height to live crown, (3) reduce canopy bulk
density, and (4) reduce continuity of the forest canopy." 63
Although data on mechanical treatments are somewhat limited,
they appear to be effective in reducing fire intensity and reducing the
likelihood of canopy ignition under certain conditions. They are
particularly useful in the wildland-urban interface, where concerns
about smoke and threat to structures make fire treatments unappealing.
GTR-120, 2004) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., SCIENCE BASIS], http://www.fs.fed.us/
rm/pubs/rmrs.gtr120.pdf.
59. Although mechanical treatments and fire use projects generally have the common
goal of altering fuels to reduce fire intensity, they are discussed separately here because the
risks and benefits of each are substantially different. Many policies implicitly or explicitly
favor one method over the other.
60. PYNE ET AL., supra note 57, at 405.
61.

THEODORE DANIEL ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF SILVICULTURE 419 (2nd ed. 1979).

62.

Id. at 420-23.

63.

U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 58, at 23-24.
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Some recent observational and experimental studies suggest that
thinning projects that remove only the smallest trees and leave larger
trees in place are associated with the greatest reductions in fire intensity
and crown fire occurrence. 64 However, other types of mechanical
treatments, including pruning lower branches and reducing surface
fuels, can also be effective tools in reducing the likelihood of crown
fires.65 More intensive mechanical treatments are also associated with a
reduction in crown fires. This is particularly true when thinning of
smaller trees is combined with other treatments, such as prescribed
burning, slash removal, and removing fuels from tree bases. 66
Mechanical treatments in the wildland-urban interface are often
the most convenient, economically efficient, and ecologically benign way
of protecting interface communities from fire. Clearing vegetation from
within 20 to 40 meters of structures is one of the most effective ways of
preventing their ignition. 67 Treating small, isolated patches in a large
landscape, on the other hand, is unlikely to affect fire behavior because
fires often burn quickly over large areas of fuels. 68
Because of a number of risks and problems associated with
mechanical treatments, they should generally be seen as a step toward
the eventual reintroduction of fire. For example, mechanical treatments
tend to be prohibitively expensive. The small size of billions of trees in
western forests makes them worthless from an economic standpoint, and
removing them costs hundreds of dollars per acre; a study of fuel
reduction projects in Colorado forests found that projects requiring the
removal of fuels could cost in excess of $1,000 per acre.69 Approximately
ten million acres of federal land have been designated as being in
Condition Class 3, which indicates that their proximity to communities
and watersheds and high stem densities make them the highest-priority

64.

Erik J. Martinson & Philip N. Omi, Performance of Fuel Treatments Subjected to

Wildfires, in FIRE FUEL TREATMENTS AND ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION: CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS 7 (U.S. Dep't of Agric., RMRS-P-29, 2003) [hereinafter FUEL TREATMENTS],

availableat http://www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs/rmrs-p029.html.
65. See generally P.N. Omi & K. Kalabokidis, Fire Damage on Extensively vs. Intensively
Managed Forest Stands in the North Fork Fire 1988, 65 NW. Sci. 149, 156 (1991).
66. Jolie Pollet & Philip N. Omi, Effect of Thinning and PrescribedBurning on Crown Fire
Severity in PonderosaPine Forests, 11 INT'LJ. WILDLAND FIRE 1, 3,6 (2002).
67. Jack D. Cohen, Preventing Disaster:Home Ignitability in the Wildland-Urban Interface,
98 J. FORESTRY, Mar. 2000, at 15, 20.
68.

U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 58, at 29.

69. Dennis L. Lynch & Kurt Mackes, Costs for Reducing Fuels in Colorado Forest
Restoration Projects,in FUEL TREATMENTS, supra note 64, at 167, 174.
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lands for treatment. 70 At the national level in the United States, Fire
Regime Condition Class data suggest that the USDA Forest Service alone
should remove small trees from more than 50 million acres (classified as
Condition Class 3 by land management agencies) immediately, and then
71 Lands
start work on another 80 million acres (Condition Class 2).
managed by the National Park Service, Bureau of Land Management,
state agencies, and private citizens face similar problems. Finally,
because of rapid regrowth, agencies must eventually plan to implement
a program of "maintenance" in many western forests that uses mainly
low-intensity prescribed fires.
At the same time, the effectiveness of mechanical treatments is
poorly documented. Most relevant research relies on computer-based
modeling to show that mechanical removal of fuels would reduce fire
severity and/or extent. Modeling neatly avoids many of the practical
problems with experimental design associated with the study of
unpredictable, large-scale fires. 72 However, a model's results are only as
good as the data and assumptions used to build it. In some cases, this
problem results in clearly circular reasoning. The assumption that fuel
reduction activities will moderate fire behavior is built into the model, so
an outcome favoring thinning activities is unavoidable. For example, tree
density is often included in models as a major part of the definition of
fire risk, despite a lack of clear quantitative evidence. Because thinning
reduces density by definition, models tend to suggest that all kinds of
thinning will reduce fire risk.73 Similarly, nearly all models overgeneralize the parameters (a necessary evil in modeling ecosystems) by
applying a specific model to an extremely broad ecosystem type such as
"forests," "forests of western North America," or "boreal forests"; even
where a specific study area is used, there is no evidence that one type of
fuel or fire regime necessarily predominates across what are usually
politically defined landscapes. 74 Modelers also have to choose (or ignore

70. Ten million acres of federal land have been designated as the highest priority for
treatment due to their high stem densities in proximity to communities and watersheds.
Wes Smalling, Doomed to Burn?, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, Mar. 3, 2003, at Al.
71.

KIRSTEN M. SCHMIDT ET AL., DEVELOPMENT OF COARSE-SCALE SPATIAL DATA FOR

WILDLAND FIRE AND FUEL MANAGEMENT 14 tbl.7 (U.S. Dep't of Agric., Forest Serv., Rocky
Mtn. Res. Station, Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-87, 2002), http://www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs/
rmrsgtr87.pdf.
72. Pollet & Omi, supranote 66, at 2.
73. See, e.g., Scott Lewis Stephens, Evaluation of the Effects of Silviculturaland Fuels Treatments on Potential Fire Behaviour in Sierra Nevada Mixed-Conifer Forests, 105 FOREST ECOLOGY
& MGMT. 21, 23 (1998).
74. Miguel G. Cruz et al., Assessing Canopy Fuel Stratum Characteristics in Crown Fire
Prone Fuel Types of Western North America, 12 INT'L J. WILDLAND FIRE 39 (2003). See generally
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altogether) specific climate and weather variables from the wide
variability that can exist even within a specific forest during a given
season or fire event. With the number of potential variables that is
manageable within any particular computer-based fire model, it is very
difficult to model fire behavior with reasonable accuracy.
Furthermore, thinning should not be expected to prevent crown
fires completely, and certain weather conditions can cause extreme fires
to breach treated areas. 75 For example, a post-fire analysis of the 2002
Hayman Fire suggested that where high winds, very low fuel moisture,
and weather patterns combined, the fire completely overwhelmed most
attempts at fuel modifications. 76 In certain kinds of forests, including
spruce-fir and mixed conifer forests in the western United States, fire
spread may be constrained primarily by fuel moisture, not by fuel
continuity. 77 In ecosystems where fire is driven primarily by weather and
climate, manipulation of fuels through mechanical treatments may not
significantly affect fire behavior. 78
Many mechanical treatments also have negative side effects on
ecosystems. These effects include the introduction of nonnative species,
construction of roads, soil compaction, sedimentation, removal of the
organic surface layer of soils, damage to non-target trees, decreases in
habitat quality for some wildlife species, and an overall reduction in
biodiversity and complexity. 79 In many cases, methods are available to
ameliorate these problems, and these methods should be addressed
specifically in treatment planning.
In some cases, mechanical treatments can actually increase fire
frequency or intensity. This apparent paradox is produced by several
Ertugrul Bilgili, Stand Development and Fire Behavior, 179 FOREST ECOLOGY & MGMT. 333
(2003).
75.

U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 58, at 23.

76. Erik Martinson et al., Effects of Fuel Treatments on Fire Severity, in HAYMAN FIRE
CASE STUDY 96, 96 (U.S. Dep't of Agric., Forest Serv., Rocky Mtn. Res. Station, Gen. Tech.
Rep. RMRS-GTR-114, 2003), availableat http://www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs/rmrsgtrll4.html.
77. Matthew G. Rollins et al., Landscape-scale Controls over 20th Century Fire Occurrence
in Two Large Rocky Mountain (USA) Wilderness Areas, 17 LANDSCAPE ECOLOGY 539, 554
(2002).
78. W.C. Bessie & E.A. Johnson, The Relative Importance of Fuels and Weather on Fire
Behavior in Subalpine Forests, 76 ECOLOGY 747, 756 (1995) (concluding that "weather is more
important than fuel in fire behavior").
79. See generally Merrill R. Kaufmann et al., Using Tree Recruitment Patterns and Fire
History to Guide Restoration of an Unlogged Ponderosa Pine/Douglas-FirLandscape in the
Southern Rocky Mountains After a Century of Fire Suppression, 76 FORESTRY 231 (2003); J.D.
McIver et al., Environmental Effects and Economics of Mechanized Logging for Fuel Reduction in
Northeastern Oregon Mixed-Conifer Stands, 18 W. J. APPLIED FORESTRY 238 (2003); R.M.
Muzika et al., Using Thinning as a Management Tool for Gypsy Moth: The Influence on Small
Mammal Abundance, 192 FOREST ECOLOGY & MGMT. 349 (2004).
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noteworthy effects of thinning. First, mechanical treatments tend to
increase, not decrease, woody debris and flammable ground cover when
slash is not removed after thinning. This may increase fire frequency and
intensity, because although the understory decreases ladder fuels, there
is a buildup of surface fuels.80 Thinning forests, especially closed-canopy
types, can also exacerbate the drying of fuels, windthrow, and wind
breakage due to increased exposure to sun and wind.81 Finally,
vegetation reestablishes rapidly in treated forests. In fact, thinning is a
standard silvicultural method for triggering regeneration; because many
species resprout vigorously, a single treatment may actually increase
82
understory stem density very quickly.
In conclusion, mechanical treatments can be very useful within
certain prescriptions but, like any management tool, they carry certain
risks. These treatments are most likely to be effective and efficient in the
wildland-urban interface (where costs are relatively low and other
management techniques often are problematic) or when used to reduce
specific kinds of hazardous fuels before reintroducing fire.
Fire Treatments
Controlled fire treatments, including both prescribed fires and
lightning-ignited "wildland fire use" fires, 8 3 are another potential means
of reducing or changing the structure of available fuels. Pyne notes,
"Earlier, fire was considered controlled only if it burned within the
perimeter of firelines or fuelbreaks; now fire is considered controlled if it
burns within the conditions established by a prescription."8 4 Fires are
especially practical in remote locations or in rough terrain where other
management activities are impractical or even impossible. The use of fire
can also be combined with mechanical treatments to burn slash piles
80. Amy E.M. Waltz et al., Diversity in Ponderosa Pine Forest Structure Following
Ecological Restoration Treatments, 49 FOREST SCI. 885, 893 (2003).
81. Peter Z. Ful6 et al., Comparing Ecological Restoration Alternatives: Grand Canyon,
Arizona, 170 FOREST ECOLOGY & MGMT. 19, 37 (2002); U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIc., SCIENCE BASIS,
supra note 58, at 25; Thomas E. Kolb et al., Six-Year Changes in Mortality and Crown Condition
of Old-Growth PonderosaPines in Ecological Restoration Treatments at the G.A. Pearson Natural
Area, in PONDEROSA PINE ECOSYSTEMS RESTORATION AND CONSERVATION: STEPS TOWARD

STEWARDSHIP 61, 65 (U.S. Dep't of Agric., Forest Serv., Rocky Mtn. Res. Station, Proc.
RMRS-P-22, 2001), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs/rmrsp022.html.
82.

RALPH D. NYLAND, SILVICULTURE: CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS 394-96 (2d ed.

2002).
83. Wildland fire use, also known as "let bum" fire, is a naturally ignited fire that is
not immediately suppressed but rather is managed within pre-established guidelines.
84.

STEPHEN J. PYNE, FIRE IN AMERICA: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF WILDLAND AND RURAL

FIRE 17 (1997) [hereinafter PYNE, FIRE IN AMERICA].
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after thinning or to maintain an open, grassy understory that has been
produced by previous treatments.
Fire is often attractive to managers and members of the public
because it was historically very common in most North American
ecosystems. Species that evolved with periodic fire have developed an
impressive variety of adaptations to it.85 The use of naturally ignited fire
is usually relatively inexpensive, and it can cover large areas efficiently,
especially when the fire is lightning-ignited but burning within
prescribed parameters. Recent research suggests that fire plays a very
special role in many ecosystems, which fire "surrogates" such as
mechanical treatments cannot always replace.
Many North American species that evolved with fire are in some
sense fire-dependent: some part of their life cycle is dependent on fire.
For example, cones of some forms of lodgepole pine (Pinus contorta)
require a high degree of heat to release seeds, which occurs at the right
temperature during a fire. 86 Likewise, many common tree species are
shade intolerant and depend on fire to open up the canopy at regular
intervals. 87 Low-intensity fires can also enrich forest soils by recycling
the nutrients in dead fuels and organic materials on the forest floor,
thereby increasing soil pH, stimulating nitrification, and increasing the
availability of many minerals.88
Manipulating fire frequency and intensity can be a good method
for reaching a variety of management goals. Where fires are frequent,
they are known to promote thinning of some species, maintenance of a
grassy substratum, and the exclusion of less fire-tolerant species. 89 For
example, ponderosa pine (Pinus ponderosa Dougl. ex Laws.) is generally
considered to be adapted to fairly frequent, low-intensity fires and is not
particularly susceptible to fire mortality once mature. 90 The wetter
forests, such as mixed conifer and spruce-fir dominated forests, tend to
have very long intervals and more intense fires and are characterized by

85. See generally FIRE AND ECOSYSTEMS (T.T. Kozlowski & C.E. Ahlgren eds., 1974);
WRIGHT & BAILEY, supra note 56; Allen A. Steuter & Guy R. McPherson, Fire as a Physical
Stress, in WILDLAND PLANTS: PHYSIOLOGICAL ECOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENTAL MORPHOLOGY

550 (Donald J. Bedunah & Ronald E. Sosebee eds., 1995).
86.

JAMES A. YOUNG & CHERYL G. YOUNG, SEEDS OF WOODY PLANTS IN NORTH

AMERICA 250 (1992). See also H. Weaver, Effects of Fire on Temperate Forests: Western United
States, in FIRE AND ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 85, at 279, 297 (citing John Muir's 1901
description of lodgepole pines releasing seeds after a fire).
87. Common shade-intolerant species include, for example, Douglas fir, lodgepole
pine, and aspen. WRIGHT & BAILEY, supra note 56, at 248.
88. Nyland, supra note 82, at 106-16; Weaver, supra note 86, at 293.
89. Nyland, supra note 82, at 109.
90. WRIGHT & BAILEY, supra note 56, at 209.
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both surface and crown fires. 91 In any forest ecosystem, burning favors
more fire-tolerant, shade-intolerant species (such as ponderosa pine)
over more shade-tolerant, fire-intolerant species (such as Douglas-fir,
Pseudotsugamenziesii var. glauca (Breissn.) Franco).
The effective use of fire as a management tool is dependent on
detailed knowledge of the fire ecology of a particular system. Tree-ring
records and historical accounts can provide rough estimates of past fire
frequency and intensity. However, to use fire to meet specific
management goals and to maintain biodiversity, managers must have a
great deal of information on the effects of fire on individual species and
sites. Fire use requires land and fire managers with superb skills in
ecology, watershed function, adaptive long-term management, smoke
management, and public relations.
As with any management tool, there are several drawbacks to
the use of fire. The effects of fire are not necessarily more permanent
than those of mechanical treatments. Many species (for example, New
Mexico locust and quaking aspen) resprout vigorously after fire. 92 Thus,
the use of fire to meet management goals requires a long-term strategy.
Somewhat paradoxically, very narrow prescriptions must be met in
terms of weather, fuel moisture, and other factors if managers are to
control prescribed fires. Several years may pass while managers wait for
an appropriate time to burn a particular area. As a result, it is often
difficult to burn an area frequently enough to actually change fire
behavior. In a recent General Accounting Office (GAO) report, weather
accounted for 40 percent of the delays on fuels projects at sites visited by
GAO researchers. 93 When managers are forced to work within very
specific time constraints for planning and budgetary reasons, projects
can be easily thwarted by even normal variability. For example, National
Park Service field units typically spend only 50 to 60 percent of the
money budgeted for prescribed bums each year, largely due to
unsuitable weather conditions, and money that is not spent is withdrawn
and reallocated. 94
91. See id. at 240; Tania Schoennagel et al., The Interaction of Fire, Fuels, and Climate
Across Rocky Mountain Forests,54 BIOSCIENCE 661,663 (2004).
92. D.A. PERALA, Populus Tremuloides Michx: Quaking Aspen, in 2 SILVICS OF NORTH
AMERICA: HARDWOODS (U.S. Dep't of Agric., Handbook 654, 1990), http://www.na.fs.fed.
us/spfo/pubs/silvics manual/volume_2/silvicsv2.pdf (follow document hyperlink to
"Populus tremuloides Michx").
93.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., REP. GAO-03-805, WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT:
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS REQUIRED TO BETrER IDENTIFY AND PRIORITIZE LANDS NEEDING FUELS
REDUCTION 4 (2003).
94. NAT'L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., STUDY OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FEDERAL
WILDLAND FIRE POLICY: PHASE 1 REPORT: PERSPECTIVES ON CERRO GRANDE AND
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Public perception of fire varies greatly and can be especially
negative when controlled burns escape and threaten communities. In
general, it is more difficult to use fire in heavily developed areas, where
residents are nervous about the risk of escape and where smoke
management is a concern. Attitudes toward wildland fire use are
95
generally more negative than those of prescribed fires.
Smoke from wildland fires, whether prescribed or otherwise, can
be a serious health concern, especially for older residents (a problem that
is exacerbated in and around retirement communities in the Southwest).
Ambient levels of particulate matter often exceed EPA standards (see
Clean Air Act discussion below), and exposure to smoke has often been
associated with increased incidences of conjunctivitis, sinusitis, chronic
96
obstructive pulmonary disease, bronchitis, asthma, and chest pain.
The perception that frequent, low-intensity fires are good for
forest health has led to massive overgeneralizations in the application of
fire. A very real threat to biodiversity can result when fire is used
without regard to specific ecosystem and site characteristics. Although
nearly all western forest species evolved with fire and thus have
adaptations for dealing with it, it is not always obvious to managers
what kind of fire regime they are best adapted to. For example, in many
mixed-conifer forests, fire normally occurs very infrequently and only
during extreme drought conditions. These very intense crown fires cause
massive mortality, which is necessary for the regeneration of shadeintolerant species and for the maintenance of a biologically diverse
ecosystem. 97 An attempt to "restore" frequent, low-intensity burns into
an area that evolved with infrequent burns may adversely affect many
species, just as very intense burns threaten species that are adapted to
low intensity fires. Likewise, species whose numbers are already greatly
diminished (most notably threatened and endangered species) are more
threatened by fire, even if the species as a whole is well adapted to avoid
or resist fire. In such a case, a very minor negative impact, such as the
loss of just a few individuals, could jeopardize the survival of that
population or species.

RECOMMENDED

ISSUES FOR FURTHER STUDY 66-67 (2000), http://www.nps.gov/cerro

grande/NAPAFederal Fire.Phasejl.pdf.
95. Hanna J. Cortner et al., Fire Hazards at the Urban-Wildland Interface: What the Public
Expects, 14 ENVTL. MGMT. 57, 58 (1990).
96. See generally Joshua A. Mott et al., Wildland Forest Fire Smoke: Health Effects and
Intervention Evaluation, Hoopa, California, 1999, 176 W. J. MED. 157 (2002); D. Shusterman et
al., Immediate Health Effects of an Urban Wildfire, 158 W. J. MED. 133 (1993).
97. Weaver, supra note 86, at 292-93; Schoennagel et al., supra note 91, at 670-71.
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Fire Suppression
Fire suppression has long been the primary tool of fire
managers. 98 As noted above, the implication that aggressive fire
suppression has caused a buildup of hazardous fuels has led managers
to reconsider the pervasive use of these tactics. Nonetheless, the majority
of fire management funding (as well as the bulk of public attention) still
goes to fire suppression. 99 Suppression tactics, including very expensive
aerial suppression techniques, are still used not only in the wildland
urban interface but also in remote areas where little threat to human life
and property exists.
Much of the continuing emphasis on fire suppression is due to
the idea that putting out small fires is the only way to prevent them from
becoming large fires and eventually threatening human communities.
However, the greatest benefit of suppression tactics is that when used in
the wildland urban interface where homeowners who construct
"defensible spaces" around their homes and construct roofs from less
flammable materials, firefighters can protect communities from all but
1°°
the most extreme fires.
The most obvious problem with fire suppression as a
management technique is that it continues the buildup of fuels that is so
frequently cited as having reached a "crisis" level and will eventually be
subject to fire again, and that next fire may prove to be even more
intense. Another drawback of suppression techniques is that they are
rarely effective on large or intense fires without the cooperation of the
weather. 10 1 Many techniques only succeed when a change in weather
patterns brings increased humidity, lower wind speeds, and/or rain or
when a fire literally runs out of fuel. A publication by the Western Fire
Ecology Center quotes a U.S. Forest Service Fire Program Leader as
saying, "Often we use resources because of the public and political
pressure to do something, even though it has no effect on the fire and is
an economic waste." 10 2 Indeed, suppressing fires is exceedingly
98. See generally PYNE, FIRE IN AMERICA, supra note 84 (history of fire suppression
policy in the United States).
99.

Ross W. Gorte, Policy Response, in HUMANS, FIRES, AND FORESTS -SOCIAL

SCIENCE

APPLIED TO FIRE MANAGEMENT 59, 59 (Hanna J. Cortner et al. eds., 2003), http://ncrs.fs.fed.
us/pubs/jrnl/2003/nc_2003_cortner_001.pdf.
100. Cohen, supra note 67, at 20, 21.
101. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., Rep. GAO/RCED-99-65, WESTERN NATIONAL
FORESTS: A COHESIVE STRATEGY IS NEEDED TO ADDRESS CATASTROPHIC WILDFIRE THREATS
27-28 (1999).
102. TIMOTHY INGALSBEE, AMERICAN LANDS ALLIANCE, MONEY TO BURN: THE
ECONOMICS OF FIRE AND FUELS MANAGEMENT, PART ONE: FIRE SUPPRESSION 4 & n.16 (2000),

http://www.americanlands.org/documents/1091484376_moneyburnreport.pdf

(quoting
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expensive. In recent years, federal land management agencies have
regularly spent more than $1 billion annually on fire suppression, and
suppression costs for individual large fires can run well into the
millions. 10 3 As noted in the Fiscal Year 2003 budget, "In some western
areas, the government pays more in suppressing fires than the fair
market value of the structures threatened by those fires. It would literally
be cheaper to let the fires burn and pay 100 percent of the rebuilding
cost." 104 This statement is particularly striking in light of the threat to
firefighters' lives and safety that is involved in these obviously
uneconomic endeavors. Indeed, the number of acres burned by wildfires
has varied considerably from year to year but has shown no substantial
linear increase since 1960 (Figure 2).105 However, the number of
firefighter fatalities has increased each decade since the 1940s (Figure
3).106 The aggressive suppression of fires should also be tempered by a
thorough understanding of the negative environmental impacts of
firefighting activities. 107

Richard Mangan, Fire Program Leader, U.S. Forest Serv., Washington Office, Issues in
Large Wildfire Suppression Cost Reductions, presentation at the Symposium on Fire
Economics: Planning and Policy Bottom Lines, San Diego, Cal., Apr. 6,1999).
103. Nat'l Interagency Fire Ctr., supra note 23 (for total annual costs, follow "Wildland
Fire Suppression Costs" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 14, 2007).
104.

OFF. OF MGMT & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2003, at 66, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/us
budget/ fy03/pdf/budget.pdf.
105. Nat'l Interagency Fire Ctr., supra note 23 (for data used in Figure 2, follow
"Wildland Fires and Acres (1960-2005)" hyperlink).
106.

NATL

INTERAGENCY

FIRE CTR., WILDLAND

FIRE ACCIDENTS BY YEAR

(n.d.),

http://www.nifc.gov/reports/year.pdf (including fatalities from 1940 to 2004, as shown in
Figure 3).
107. See generally Dana M. Backer et al., Impacts of Fire-SuppressionActivities on Natural
Communities, 18 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 937 (2004).
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Figure 3: Annual Firefighter Fatalities, United States 1940-2003

The most notable conclusion of this brief review is that these
three kinds of fire management practices each have an appropriate time
and place. Mechanical treatments are generally most effective in the
areas where controlled burning is impractical, especially in the narrow
margins of the wildland-urban interface. The use of fire as a
management tool is most practical outside the interface, and where
specific management goals and a detailed knowledge of fire ecology can
be used to develop effective prescriptions. Fire suppression, in turn, is
generally only economically viable when densely populated or highly
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valued areas are directly threatened - and perhaps not even then. As will
be demonstrated in the next section, policies can strongly favor a single
form of management, sometimes making it difficult for fire managers to
choose a combination of fire management practices that is well suited to
a particular site.
V. FIRE AND FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
Schneider and Ingram define policy design as a "purposeful and
normative enterprise through which the elements of policy are arranged
to serve particular values, purposes, and interests."108 In the United
States, a network of federal, state, and local policies has been developed
to regulate the actions of public and private land and natural resource
managers and their impacts on the environment. When applied to realworld management activities, the system of incentives (whether coercive
or enabling, direct or indirect) laid out by these policies is often
confusing, complex, and even contradictory. This should not be
surprising; after all, environmental policies have evolved over several
decades through a variety of administrations and management
paradigms and through the debate and negotiation of countless decision
makers. They are implemented in a constantly changing environment.
This complexity, however, need not always have a paralyzing effect on
managers because most policies leave the responsible bureaucratic
agencies a great deal of flexibility in implementation.
One of the major ways policies influence the behavior of groups
and individuals is through the creation of incentives and sanctions.
However, due to the unpredictable processes of policy development and
implementation, the incentives created are not always appropriate to the
initial goals. A society or group's needs and priorities may also shift, so
that policy incentives can become normatively inappropriate (in other
words, policy no longer supports society's goals). In the case of wildland
fire, different policies create incentives or disincentives for different fire
management activities. They can encourage or discourage the use of the
three management strategies described above, each of which has its own
risks and benefits. They can also provide incentives for managers to
follow the guidelines set out by federal fire policies discussed in part III,
to involve the public and other agencies in their decision making, and to
work from a strong scientific basis. Conversely, of course, they can also
create disincentives for the same activities.

108.

SCHNEIDER & INGRAM, supra

note 9, at 3.
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The application of these policies in the context of wildland fire
management is no less complex. Regulatory environmental policies
create incentives and disincentives for different fire-management
activities, making them more or less attractive to managers. These
incentives may become problematic, for example, when they contradict
one another, when they favor management activities that are
economically or ecologically inappropriate, or when they subvert
democratic processes.
The sections that follow examine four major federal policies that
often affect fire-management decisions: the National Environmental
Policy Act, the Endangered Species Act, the Wilderness Act, and the
Clean Air Act. The goals and implementation of each policy are briefly
summarized, followed by a description of the incentives and
disincentives that these policies create for managers to use or reject the
three fire management activities described in part IV, namely mechanical
treatments, controlled fire treatments, and fire suppression.
The National Environmental Policy Act
The underlying intent of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) is to require federal agencies to incorporate environmental
considerations into project development and decision-making processes.
More importantly, NEPA requires federal agencies to put this decisionmaking process into writing and makes it open to public and judicial
review at several levels. One of the stated goals of NEPA is "to promote
efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and
biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man." 10 9 Thus, NEPA
is essentially a legislative attempt to ensure that public health and
environmental quality are considered in all federal agency actions. Its
application is not limited to formal project planning but covers a variety
of federal activities from small-scale public resource allocations to major
land use planning to federal legislation.
NEPA barely comprises ten pages, largely because the details of
its implementation are set out separately in the Code of Federal
Regulations ° and in other regulations set forth by individual agencies.
The statute itself consists of three main parts. The first outlines the intent
of the act by setting goals for the environmental health of the nation and
establishing the role of the federal government in assuring "for all
Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally

109.
110.

42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000).
40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1518 (2006).
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pleasing surroundings."' The second main part forms the core of the
act, stating in part that every federal agency must examine the
environmental impacts of its decisions and must include these
environmental considerations in the decision-making process. Furthermore, it must do so in a formal, systematic, and interdisciplinary
manner. 112 NEPA establishes the President's Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ)."' The CEQ was established to provide the federal
agencies with guidance in implementing NEPA and developed a set of
guidelines for that process that are widely used by agencies and courts
and play a substantial role in the interpretation and implementation of
NEPA.
Most planned fire-management activities are subject to NEPA
analysis, although several major exceptions are described below. Federal
agencies must determine whether a proposed activity will have a
significant environmental impact, usually through an environmental
analysis (EA), and, if so, must develop an environmental impact
statement (EIS) describing the potential impacts and the impacts of a
range of viable alternatives to the project while incorporating significant
public comments and participation. n 4 The responsible agency must then
respond to any public comments.
The Supreme Court has ruled that NEPA is a strictly procedural
n5
statute.
In other words, although it forces agencies to formally
consider the environmental impacts of their actions, it does not in any
way dictate the final decision on the action. An agency could legally take
the most environmentally destructive course of action of all its
alternatives, provided that it appropriately considered the impacts and
alternatives and set forth its reasoning as required by NEPA regulations.
The procedural nature of NEPA is critical to its compatibility with firemanagement activities. With fire management, as with many natural
resource management situations, there is often no management decision
that is clearly more environmentally preferable than all other
alternatives. NEPA allows federal agencies significant flexibility in
balancing fire management priorities while still ensuring that these
priorities are considered in a formal and public manner. Therefore, from
its actual text, NEPA appears not to favor any specific fire management
activity.

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (2000).
Id. § 4332.
Id. § 4342.
40 C.F.R. § 1502 (2006).
Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223,227 (1980).
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In implementation, however, certain activities are often treated
differently by NEPA. First, agency directors have appropriately made it
clear that public and firefighter safety takes first priority in any fire
management activities. The NEPA regulations developed by the CEQ
allow agencies to make special arrangements when emergency
circumstances prevent full NEPA documentation from being completed
before an action is taken.11 6 As a result, fire suppression activities are not
subject to environmental analysis under NEPA. While the reasoning
behind this exception is clear and understandable, it could create an
incentive for fire managers to rely on fire suppression, which, when
unplanned, avoids the NEPA process and its associated paperwork,
administrative oversight, and public review procedures entirely. This
incentive would obviously contradict the federal fire policy goal of
reintroducing fire.
The Fire Management Plans (FMPs) mandated by Federal Fire
Policy are subject to NEPA analysis. FMPs must outline all strategic fire
management practices, including plans for fire suppression. These
documents are subject to NEPA both because they form part of the
broader Land Management Plans (which are subject to NEPA) and
because they do not constitute an emergency response to any imminent
danger.1 7 Thus, the Federal Fire Policy, when properly implemented,
removes the incentive to rely more heavily on unplanned fire
suppression practices.
In 2003, the USDA Forest Service and the Department of the
Interior announced a regulation change 18 that named certain fire
management activities as "categorical exclusions": categories of actions
that do not normally significantly affect the human environment and
therefore do not require development of an EA or EIS except under
special circumstances.1 19 As a result of this rule change, many of the
smaller hazardous fuel reduction and post-fire rehabilitation projects are
effectively exempted from NEPA. As a result, an incentive exists for fire
managers to use those activities preferentially. This incentive applies to
mechanical and controlled fire activities that:

116. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 (2006).
117. Id.
118. This was a non-legislative change to the regulations that outline NEPA
implementation in the federal agencies.
119. Notice, Comment, and Appeal Procedures for National Forest System Projects and
Activities, 68 Fed. Reg. 33,582 June 4, 2003) (codified at 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.1-215.22) (Forest
Service); Special Rules Applicable to Public Land Hearings and Appeals, 68 Fed. Reg.
33,794, 33,795, 33,804 (June5, 2003) (codified at 43 C.F.R. §§ 4190.1, 5003.1) (Bureau of Land
Management).
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0 Are conducted for the primary purpose of hazardous
fuels reduction and will not involve the sales of vegetation
except when removed with the intention of reducing
hazardous fuels;
" Are not conducted in wilderness areas;
" Do not use herbicides or pesticides;
" Do not involve the construction of new permanent
roads;
0 Do not exceed 1,000 acres for mechanical treatments and
4,500 acres for fire treatments; and
E Are conducted in the wildland-urban interface or in
other areas classified as historically having relatively
frequent, low- to moderate-intensity fires (Fire Regime
Groups I, II, or III) and as having a moderate to high
departure from historical fire regimes (Fire Regime

Condition Classes 2 or 3).120
It is important to note that the regulation change applies to any
hazardous-fuels reduction projects that meet these broad requirements.
For example, mechanical treatments are not limited to the wildlandurban interface, nor is the harvest of large trees limited in any way. As a
result of this change, the regulations implementing NEPA provide an
inappropriate incentive for several kinds of activities that are unlikely to
be effective in changing fire behavior, such as small-scale thinning
projects outside the wildland-urban interface.
Healthy Forests Restoration Act
Congress made a second set of changes to NEPA's procedural
requirements with the Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003
(HFRA). 121 Under normal circumstances, an environmental impact
statement (EIS) consists of a clear comparison of the proposed action
with a range of alternative actions, including a "no action" option. The
range of environmental consequences for each potential action is also
included. With the requirement of a "no action" alternative, NEPA
acknowledges that, as is common in fire management, a failure to act can
also have significant consequences. Hazardous-fuels reduction projects
covered by the HFRA (generally those in specific areas classified by
120. National Environmental Policy Act Documentation Needed for Fire Management
Activities: Categorical Exclusions, 68 Fed. Reg. 33,814, 33,814 Uune 5, 2003).
121. Pub. L. No. 108-148, 117 Stat. 1887 (16 U.S.C.A. §§ 6501-6591 (Supp. 2006)).
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agencies as high risk but not in wilderness or wilderness study areas) are
subject to less stringent requirements and generally must present and
analyze only the proposed agency action, the "no action" alternative,
and one additional alternative. Projects that are very near at-risk
communities in the wildland-urban interface are generally not required
to develop either the "no action" or additional alternative.
The changes in implementation described above provide clear
incentives for certain kinds of management. The rule change involving
categorical exclusions favors hazardous fuels projects that are in the
wildland-urban interface and in high-risk areas and that are relatively
small both in scope and in their potential for negative environmental
impacts. 122 The HFRA favors projects that are in the wildland-urban
interface but also provides incentives for projects outside the interface.
Interestingly, the treatment of areas with threatened or endangered
species is also included (see ESA section below). Individual projects are
not limited in size, although a total maximum of 20,000,000 acres may be
treated, nor are they limited to specific activities.
However, there is a caveat to the idea of incentives as discussed
here. Thus far it has been assumed (both in policy making and in this
analysis) that NEPA provides incentives for management only by
making specific activities exempt. This takes for granted that managers
will be motivated by an aversion to "jumping through the hoops" of
NEPA and will prefer any activity that is excluded from NEPA analysis.
The recent focus by many agency leaders on the "red tape" aspects of
NEPA compliance supports this idea. However, it is important to
remember that NEPA was created for a reason. Where due process can
avoid environmental damage, bad publicity, and litigation, "jumping
through the hoops" can be an advantage to management agencies;
indeed, agencies often claim that a desire to avoid litigation or bad
publicity causes land managers to produce analyses that are more
thorough than NEPA requires. 123 The primary intent of NEPA was to
promote transparency where agency actions may threaten the
environment. In such situations, transparency benefits agencies as well
as citizens, and NEPA can provide incentives for management that is
122. The HFRA definitions of these areas are admittedly quite broad. The wildlandurban interface is defined as the area within one-half or one-and-one-half miles of
designated "at-risk communities," depending on topography, geographic characteristics,
and Fire Regime Condition Class. 16 U.S.C. § 6511(16). These communities, in turn, are
listed in the Federal Register under the National Fire Plan. The list includes 11,376
communities that are in the vicinity of federal lands that are at high risk from wildfire.
Urban Wildland Interface Communities Within the Vicinity of Federal Lands That Are at
High Risk from Wildfire, 66 Fed. Reg. 43,384, 43,384 (Aug. 17,2001).
123. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Whither NEPA?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 333,344-46 (2004).
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based on scientific knowledge but remains open to public input and
scrutiny.
NEPA provides substantial incentives for interagency
cooperation and cooperation between agencies and the public, a priority
that is stressed in all of the fire policy documents. As part of the NEPA
process, agencies are required to "[e]ncourage and facilitate public
involvement in decisions which affect the quality of the human
environment" and to "[miake diligent efforts to involve the public in
preparing and implementing their NEPA procedures." 124 In addition to
publicizing hearings, decision notices, and the like, the responsible
agency must make a draft EIS available for public comment before the
final EIS is prepared. The agency must obtain comments from any other
federal agency with special expertise or legal jurisdiction over the
process and must request the comments of the general public (and in
particular any people or groups that might be interested or affected), any
private applicant involved in the proposed action, all relevant state and
local agencies, any tribes that may be affected, and any agency that had
previously requested to receive statements on similar actions. 125 Interagency cooperation is strongly encouraged, and agencies are permitted
to designate joint lead agencies if state or local agencies are closely
involved in the proposed project, provided at least one federal agency is
included. 26 Special provisions are also made to allow joint processes in
order to avoid overlaps in documentation between federal and state or
127
local procedure.
Unfortunately, these incentives for cooperation and coordination
have been undermined by the same policy and regulation changes
described above. By exempting some fire management activities from the
NEPA process, categorical exclusions effectively remove them from
interagency analysis as well as from the public eye. The HFRA goes even
further by limiting the administrative and judicial review processes for
the projects it covers. These restrictions are intended to reduce citizen
involvement in public lands management under the rationale that
frivolous appeals and litigation are hampering effective management.
Ironically, the measures are often referred to in Healthy Forests
documents as strengthening public participation. As Franklin and Agee
point out, the issues addressed by HFRA are "procedural matters and do
not address substantive issues such as where, how, and why fuel projects
are to be conducted. The assumption appears to be that if we free
124.
125.
126.
127.

40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.2(d), 1506.6(a) (2005).
Id. § 1506.6.
Id. § 1501.5(b).
Id. § 1506.2.
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resource managers from procedural constraints, they will make the
appropriate decisions about where, how, and why." 128 Such an
assumption ignores the many conflicting political, economic, and social
pressures that agency personnel must balance in their management
decisions.
The mistaken idea that NEPA processes inevitably slow down
fire management activities and keep managers from conducting
hazardous-fuels reduction projects has become pervasive. The above
discussion has pointed out that when federal fire policy is properly
implemented, any administrative or bureaucratic delays are likely to be
minimized since all fire-management activities should be covered by a
fire management plan. Similarly, the citizen appeals that are specifically
permitted under NEPA (except as changed by the HFRA) are often
blamed for slowing implementation and interfering with fire
management efforts; however, in limiting the use of the less costly and
less antagonistic administrative appeal process, HFRA actually risks
increasing the potential for litigation.
As with any policy, it is likely that the ground-level implementation of NEPA is significantly different than what is suggested by the
policy document itself. Agency officials often argue that the current fuels
situation is such a crisis that agencies simply do not have time to meet
the procedural requirements of the laws without further exacerbating the
problem, or that agency planning is hampered by a fear of appeals and
litigation.129
However, initial evidence suggests that these perceptions are
inaccurate. The CEQ regulations concerning NEPA implementation
clearly address issues of timeliness, and the CEQ allows agencies to set
time limits for each part of the NEPA process based on the potential for
harm, the magnitude of the action, the degree of controversy, and other
criteria. 130 A recent report from the non-partisan General Accounting
Office (GAO) suggests that litigation has played only a minor role in
delaying hazardous fuels projects. Of 762 fuels-related decisions in fiscal
years 2001 and 2002, only 180 were appealed (affecting 900,000 of a total
131
4.7 million acres) and only 23 were litigated (affecting 100,000 acres).
The same GAO report also found that 79 percent of appeals were
handled within the mandated 90-day period. A separate report found
that at sites visited by GAO researchers, 30 percent of the delays on fuels
128.
129.
130.

Franklin & Agee, supra note 18, at 60.
See, e.g., Norton & Veneman, supra note 4, at 1.
40 C.F.R. § 1501.8 (2005).

131.

U.S. GEN. AccouNnNG OFF., GAO-03-689R, FOREST SERVICE: INFORMATION ON

DECISIONS INVOLVING FUELS REDUCTION AcnvmEs 3 (2003).
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projects were caused by the reallocation of funds for fire suppression;
32
weather accounted for an additional 40 percent of delays.
The Endangered Species Act
The stated purposes of the Endangered Species Act are:
to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend may be
conserved, to provide a program for the conservation of
such endangered species and threatened species, and to
take such steps as may be appropriate to achieve the
purposes of the treaties and conventions [on international
trade in endangered species].133
Certainly the best-known impact of ESA is the establishment of
broad prohibitions against any take of animal species listed as
endangered or threatened. 134 In addition, federal agencies are required to
(a) actively promote the conservation of listed species and (b) avoid any
actions that would have negative effects on listed species and their
critical habitat. 135 The application of the Endangered Species Act to fire
management on federal lands is somewhat complex. In many cases,
scientific understanding of a listed species' relationship with fire is
limited or even nonexistent. While it is often assumed that wildland fire
poses a threat to endangered species, many species actually need fire to
maintain their populations or habitat, and many more tolerate fire
well. 36 Many animal species are able to simply avoid fire, and a recent
summary of U.S. Fish and Wildlife data showed that just four of the 186
listed, proposed, and candidate plant species that are found on Forest
Service lands are actually harmed by fire. 137 However, there is no doubt
that not only wildfires but also prescribed fires and fuel treatments can
have confusing, complex, and sometimes adverse effects on endangered
species' habitats. It can also be difficult to weigh long- and short-term

132. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., supra note 93, at 4.
133. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000).
134. Id. § 1538(a).
135. Id. § 1536(a).
136. McPherson & Weltzin, supra note 55, at 6.
137. See generally WILDLAND FIRE IN ECOSYSTEMS: EFFECTS OF FIRE ON FLORA (James K.
Brown & Jane Kapler Smith eds.) (U.S. Dep't of Agric., Forest Serv., Rocky Mtn. Res.
Station,
Gen. Tech. Rep.
RMRS-GTR-42,
2000,
updated
Feb 22,
2006),
http://www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs/rmrs-gtrO42-2.pdf; J. BENDELL, Effects of Fire on Birds and
Mammals, in FIRE AND ECOSYSTEMS, supranote 85, at 73.
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impacts of different fire management decisions in the implementation of
the ESA.
As with NEPA, the agencies responsible for implementing the
ESA (the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine
Fisheries Service) have clearly stated that firefighter and public safety is
the first priority in any fire management decision. 138 Federal regulations
related to the ESA state that, in an emergency situation, consultation may
be informal and may take place either during or after the necessary
response measures. 139 This alternative is applicable for fire suppression
tactics in general. The wildfire itself is considered an act of God and not
an agency action; thus, consideration of endangered species never takes
priority over human life. This exception again provides some incentive
for agencies to prefer fire suppression activities to mechanical and
controlled fire treatments. Indeed, this incentive (or, seen conversely, the
disincentive to use preventative treatments) can be quite strong, as the
ESA generally prohibits a planned project that threatens a listed species.
The most common "disincentives" of this kind have centered on
mechanical treatments (including post-fire "salvage" logging), although
fire treatments are also affected. The conflict comes in Section 7 of the
act, which mandates that
[e]ach Federal Agency shall, in consultation with and with
the assistance of the Secretary, insure that any action
authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency.. .is not
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered species or threatened species or result in the
destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such
species which is determined by the Secretary.. .to be critical,
unless such agency has been granted an exemption for such
140
action by the Committee ....
The standard for agency actions in terms of listed species is that jeopardy
to the listed species, whether intentional or incidental, is not likely to
occur; with very few exceptions, an agency action must not threaten the
continued existence of a listed species or destroy or degrade its
141
designated critical habitat.
Under the ESA, consultation with the responsible secretaries
(often referred to as a Section 7 consultation) is normally required for all
federal projects that may negatively affect listed species. The Section 7
138.
139.
140.
141.

Memorandum from Gale Norton to Agency, supra note 117.
50 C.F.R. § 402.05 (2005).
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000).
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Comtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 692 (1995).
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review process is relatively straightforward and is outlined within the
act; few external regulations dictate the process. The consultation
generally results in the secretary either finding that there is no likelihood
of jeopardy associated with the proposed action or suggesting alternative
actions to the agency's proposal that would not be likely to result in
jeopardy. When an agency frequently consults with a secretary on the
same kinds of projects, this consultation procedure may be replaced by a
joint counterpart agreement.
As part of President George W. Bush's Healthy Forests Initiative,
joint counterpart regulations have been developed for the activities
covered by the National Fire Plan (generally mechanical fuel reduction
and prescribed fire projects). 42 These regulations effectively establish an
alternative process for consultation for any project authorized, funded,
or carried out to implement the NFP. Under this alternative process, the
agency proposing the project is allowed to determine whether the
species' survival is jeopardized without any formal or informal
consultation with the secretaries or agencies normally responsible for
implementing the ESA. Instead, training and information is to be
provided by these implementation agencies (the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service or National Marine Fisheries Service) as needed. The goal of the
agreement is to reduce the delays that may be involved in the traditional
consultation process. Obviously, this change also removes a substantial
incentive for interagency cooperation.
The ESA is often seen as unnecessarily hindering mechanical
and fire treatments because the act does not explicitly recognize that
avoiding these management activities for fear of harming species and
their critical habitat could theoretically lead to even higher mortality of
an endangered species by creating more severe fire conditions in the
future. When it is interpreted in this way, the ESA conflicts not only with
the goals of fire policy but also with its own goals and those of other
environmental policies.
However, it should be emphasized that this is a question of
implementation only; the Secretary of the Interior is given substantial
leeway in interpreting the "no jeopardy" clause and may easily choose a
broader, more long-term view of potential species impacts. Perhaps
more importantly, the purpose of the act with respect to federal agencies
is to ensure that management actions, no matter how well intentioned
they may be, do not directly threaten the continued existence of listed
species. When confronted with a decision such as whether to conduct a

142. Joint Counterpart Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation Regulations, 68
Fed. Reg. 33,806, 33,806 (June 5, 2003) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 402).
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fuel thinning project in critical habitat or risk the eventual destruction of
such habitat to a severe fire, the formal consultation with the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service is intended to help an agency form a reasonable,
science-based opinion on the management practices in question and
avoid conflicts with Section 7 requirements. Nonetheless, agency
personnel frequently cite the ESA and the Section 7 consultation process
as barriers to fire management.
As noted above, it is also difficult to anticipate the effect a
prescribed burn or wildland fire use ("let burn") fire will have on any
given species. While the ESA requires decisions to be science-based, it
does not force agencies to wait for exhaustive studies or complete
information on a question (which would again provide an incentive to
avoid planned management practices in favor of emergency fire
suppression). Rather, agencies are to use the "best scientific and
commercial data available" in fulfilling the requirements of section 7.143
An agency must develop a biological assessment, generally within 180
days of the initiation of the consultation and before beginning the
activity, describing any listed species that might be affected.""' The time
constraint, in combination with the fact that monitoring can be and often
is recommended as part of the consultation, functions to encourage the
continuing improvement of management practices, and this flexibility
encourages the use of planned fuels treatments. Nonetheless, many
managers continue to see the ESA as a barrier to fire and fuels management activities, and the actual implementation process should be
explored in more depth on the ground.
The Wilderness Act
The intent of the Wilderness Act is
to assure that an increasing population, accompanied by
expanding settlement and growing mechanization, does
not occupy and modify all areas within the United States
and its possessions, leaving no lands designated for
preservation and protection in their natural condition...
[and] to secure for the American people of present and
future generations the benefits of an enduring resource of
145
wilderness.

143.
144.
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16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000).
16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1) (2000).
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To meet this goal, the Wilderness Act lays the foundation for a National
Wilderness Preservation System comprised of federal lands "where the
earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man
himself is a visitor who does not remain." 146 Over the life of the Act
(more than 40 years), its general function has remained the same: to set
aside large areas of federally owned land and prevent them from being
used in ways that would disturb their "pristine" condition. In general
(and with several notable exceptions, described below), designated
wilderness areas are protected from commercial enterprises, construction
of roads, any kind of mechanical transport (including motor vehicles,
motorized equipment, and motorboats), and construction of any
structure or installation. 147 These prohibitions apply equally to resource
managers and resource users.
Section 4(d) of the Wilderness Act permits certain prohibited
activities under special circumstances. One of these provisions can allow
an otherwise restricted activity as part of certain kinds of forest
stewardship: "such measures may be taken as may be necessary in the
control of fire, insects, and diseases, subject to such conditions as the
Secretary deems desirable." 14 Other agency-specific regulations and
guidance may apply, but all managing agencies use the "minimum
requirement" concept. 49 This requirement stipulates that wilderness
managers can authorize an activity allowed under the special provisions
described above only if it is needed to meet the minimum requirements
for the administration of the area as wilderness and if the methods used
4°
are considered the "minimum tools" for that necessary project.' For
example, mechanical thinning projects in wilderness areas often use
hand rather than motorized tools, and fire suppression efforts may
depend more heavily on hand-built lines and backfires than on aerial
suppression. Under circumstances outlined in the individual wilderness
management plans, prescribed fire, fire suppression, and use of naturalignition fires are all acceptable management practices. Certain

146. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (2000).
147. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (2000).
148. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d) (2000).
149. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (2000).
150. U.S. Dep't of Agric., Natl Park Serv., Director's Order # 41: Wilderness
Preservation and Management 7 (effective Aug. 2, 1999; sunset date Aug. 2, 2003),
http://www.nps.gov/policy/DOrders/DOrder4.doc. This order had a sunset date of
August 2, 2003, but does not appear to have been replaced by a new directive. The National
Park Service website of Director's Orders and Related Documents shows no superceding
order. Dep't of the Interior, Nat'l Park Serv. Off. of Policy, http://home.nps.gov/
applications/npspolicy/DOrders.cfm (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
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rehabilitation or restoration measures may also be prescribed by areaspecific plans.
Although the wildland-urban interface is rapidly moving closer
to the wilderness, wilderness areas are designated in part due to their
distance from heavily populated areas. As Gorte notes, "Ultimately,
'wilderness areas' are whatever Congress designates as wilderness,
regardless of developments or activities which some would argue
conflict with definition of wilderness."'15 As a result, wilderness policy
appropriately favors low-impact techniques (outlined in the USDA
Forest Service's minimum-impact suppression tactics (MIST) guidelines),
while not ruling out any specific fire management methods. 152 The
Wilderness Act allows local-level land and resource managers
substantial flexibility in dealing with fire, even while clearly promoting
wilderness priorities. The federal requirement that fire management
plans (FMPs) be developed in conjunction with wilderness management
plans in wilderness areas also promotes a thoughtful approach to
suppressing fires in the wilderness. For example, the wilderness areas
associated with the Gila National Forest in New Mexico now make
extensive use of fire as a wilderness management tool, conducting more
than 175,000 acres in large prescribed fire and wildland fire use projects
in 2003.153 However, the Leopold Institute, a USDA-administered
research group, reports that as of 2001 only about 20 percent of
wilderness areas had FMPs allowing wildland fire use.l s4
In summary, wilderness goals and fire management present a
delicate balance with regard to management of those designated
wilderness areas. Agencies must apply the minimum-requirement
concept and manage for wilderness values, but concerns that a fire
burning in a wilderness area might eventually spread to other public or
private lands also exist. Ultimately, however, this balance represents a
broader challenge to wildland fire managers, who must consider the
very different situations in and outside the wildland-urban interface in
creating and executing fire management plans. Some may find managing
fire within wilderness boundaries restrictive, while others, as in the Gila
National Forest, see wilderness areas as an opportunity to restore largescale fire processes.

151.

Ross W. GORTE, WILDERNESS: OVERVIEW AND STATISTICS, CONG. RES. SERV. REP. 94-

976 E.N.R., at 5 (1994).
152. Backer et al., supra note 107, at 938.
153. E-mail from Bob Madrid, Fire Mgmt. Off., Gila Nat'l Forest Wilderness Dist., U.S.
Dep't of Agric. Forest Serv. (Sept. 17, 2004) (on file with author).
154. Carol Miller, Wildland Fire Use: A Wilderness Perspective on Fire Management, in FUEL
TREATMENTS, supra note 64, at 279,381.
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The Clean Air Act
The underlying purpose of the Clean Air Act is to establish
155
minimum national standards for air quality. Like the Clean Water Act,
the Clean Air Act is a federal-level environmental policy that is primarily
implemented through programs at the state level. The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) sets National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS). There are two types of these standards: primary standards,
which are based on the level of air quality needed to protect human
health, and secondary standards, which take into account other, less
direct, aspects of public well-being such as the air quality needed for
healthy vegetation and wildlife or to prevent damage to buildings and
food supplies. 156 These standards have been set for six very common
pollutants: carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen dioxide (NO2), ground-level
zone (03), lead (Pb), particulate matter of ten micrometers or less (PM1o)
1 57
and 2.5 micrometers or less diameter (PM2.5), and sulfur dioxide (S02).
Under the Clean Air Act, states are required to submit a State
Implementation Plan (SIP) describing how they will reach national air
quality standards. States must then implement those plans in a timely
manner; otherwise they may face sanctions, including the withholding of
some federal highway funds. In addition to state-level programs, the
Clean Air Act has prompted regional efforts at improving
implementation, such as the Western Regional Air Partnership (WRAP),
described below.
Wildland fires, both prescribed and otherwise, often create or
contribute to air quality problems. Especially during the summer
months, wildland fires can be a significant source of airborne fine
particulate matter (PM2.5) emissions and other pollutants, including
nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds, and ammonia. 158 Because
these emissions can result in elevated levels of ambient PM2.5 and
impaired visibility, fire managers and decision makers must take Clean
Air Act standards into account when planning prescribed or fire use

155. The Clean Water Act is not discussed here because any fire-management activities
would be classified as non-point sources and would be virtually unregulated by that
policy. States are simply required to develop EPA-approved plans to deal with non-point
source pollution. PHILIP WEINBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 262 (3d

ed. 2001).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2000).
157. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, What Are the Six Common Air Pollutants?, http://www.
epa.gov/air/urbanair/6poll.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2006).
158.
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fires. The state agencies responsible for implementation can regulate
prescribed burning on federal lands; however, in practice, most federal
agencies simply call these state agencies for approval of a planned fire
159
based on weather conditions or other factors.
One of the most important parts of the Act for fire management
purposes lays out tighter standards for air quality within larger national
parks and wilderness areas, referred to as Class I Federal areas. 16 All
states are required to demonstrate progress toward a National Visibility
Goal for these areas. Class I areas are also affected by the EPA-issued
Regional Haze Rule, which requires a state-level smoke management
program.
Regional haze is visibility impairment produced by fine particles
from a variety of sources that absorb or scatter light across a broad
geographic area.161 While regional haze can also cause significant human
health and environmental effects that must be addressed, the
impairment of visibility is seen as being a particular problem for the
national parks and wilderness areas of the United States, and the Clean
Air Act sets a goal of remedying any existing visibility problems and
preventing any such future problems in Class I areas.
Implementation of the regional haze goal has been delayed due
to a lack of scientific knowledge on how pollution sources and regional
62
haze are linked. In 1999, EPA published the Regional Haze Rule,
which requires states to set specific goals for strategies for improving
visibility in Class I areas. This planning is to take place through state
implementation plans (SIPs) on regional haze. The regional haze rule
specifically encourages states to work together in regional partnerships,
such as the Western Regional Air Partnership (WRAP), a voluntary
group formed in 1997 with the goal of coordinating regional air quality
issues in the western United States, especially regional haze. Its members
include the governors of 13 western states, including Arizona and New
Mexico, as well as federal agencies and tribes.
Wildland fires are a major source of regional haze; however, the
regional haze rule applies only to anthropogenic sources of air pollution
such as utilities, pulp mills, or smelters.163 Thus, the EPA policy covers
both prescribed fires and wildland fire use but not unplanned wildland

159. Interview with Lee Alter, Envtl. Pol'y Analyst, W. Governors' Ass'n, in Tucson,
Ariz. (May 14, 2004).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 7472 (2000).
161. Regional Haze Regulations, 64 Fed. Reg. 35,714, 35,715 (uly 1, 1999) (codified at 40
C.F.R.§ 51).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 35,737.
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fires (whether ignited by humans or naturally ignited)164 Although
regional haze SIPs have been released for mandatory Class I areas of the
Colorado Plateau, the area covered does not include many other fireprone areas of the West outside the Colorado Plateau that are not
covered by individual state plans. New or expanded SIPs must be
developed by 2008 to include all Class I areas.
The EPA has recognized the complex relationships among
regional haze, wildland fire, and forest ecosystems and has suggested
that land managers should work with the EPA to reduce the impacts of
fire emissions where fire use may be otherwise beneficial. 16 For
example, the existing Arizona Regional Haze SIP defines annual
emission goals for management of fires, outlines a series of state
regulations for enhanced smoke management planning, and encourages
166
the use of non-burning alternatives in land management.
WRAP's involvement with fire management has focused on the
idea that increased fuel loads lead to more intense, widespread, and
uncontrollable fires and thus more particulate emissions. As a result,
although WRAP recommendations have generally supported the use of
prescribed fire to mitigate wildfire threat, they have particularly
emphasized the use of mechanical treatments. For example, one WRAP
report recommends the removal of federal, state, local, and tribal
"administrative barriers to the use of alternatives to burning." 167 The
Clean Air Act's focus on improving air quality in large national forests
and wilderness areas may well serve to encourage the use of mechanical
treatments in those usually isolated areas. This stands in clear
contradiction to federal fire policy goals of reintroducing fire as a
valuable management tool and ecosystem process. It also conflicts with
scientific evidence that suggests mechanical treatments should be used
primarily in the wildland-urban interface.
At the same time, WRAP and most western state governments
have pursued a focus on smoke management and emissions tracking to
facilitate some prescribed burning when this activity will not create
major air quality problems. State and tribal smoke management
programs (SMPs) are developed to manage smoke from controlled fires.

164. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INTERIM AIR QUALITY POLICY ON WILDLAND AND
PRESCRIBED FIRES 2 (1998), http://www.epa.gov/ttn/oarpg/tl/memoranda/firefnl.pdf.
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See, e.g., id. at 1.

166. AIR QUALITY Div., ARIz. DEP'T OF ENvTL. QUALITY, REGIONAL HAZE STATE
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR THE STATE OF ARIZONA 75-77 (2003), http://www.azdeq.gov/
environ/air/haze/download/2sip.pdf.
167. GRAND CANYON VISIBILITY TRANSPORT COMM'N, supra note 158, at 50.
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They are generally developed in cooperation with wildland owners and
managers. The EPA describes the purposes of SMPs:
0 To mitigate the nuisance and public safety hazards
caused by smoke in populated areas;
M To prevent problems with air quality and the violation
of national Clean Air Act standards because of controlled
fire; and
16
* To address visibility impacts in Class I Federal areas.
Although states are not required to develop smoke management
programs, the EPA has established a strong incentive. An interim
directive from the EPA on air quality and fires states that the EPA will
not designate an area as in "nonattainment" when the use of controlled
fires "cause[s] or significantly contribute[s] to" violations of the
particulate matter standards ifthe state or tribe concerned has an
approved smoke management program in place. 169 Instead, the EPA will
require a review and update of that program and will only consider
more serious sanctions after several violations have occurred. The
development of smoke management programs promises to encourage
the use of controlled fire as a management tool.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Conflicts and contradictions in fire policy and management exist
on at least three levels. First, different federal-level fire policies have
contradictory goals; from a broad perspective, some policies promote
fuels management and the reintroduction of fire, but others emphasize
and increase funding for fire suppression at the expense of more
effective management activities. Second, some policies create incentives
for fire management activities that are inappropriate from an ecological
or economic perspective. For example, recent regulation changes under
the Healthy Forests Initiative create incentives for small-scale mechanical
thinning projects outside of the wildland-urban interface; these projects
are both ecologically and economically costly and are unlikely to
influence the behavior of large fires. Finally, environmental policies
sometimes create conflicting incentives. For example, the Wilderness Act

168.
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U.S. ENVL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 164, at 17.

Any area in the nation that fails to meet national air quality standards for any of
NAAQS air pollutants is a non-attainment area. The Environmental Protection
provides a national map of non-attainment areas and estimates that 60 percent of
population lives in these areas. Id. at 8.
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creates incentives for large-scale wildland fire use, but the Endangered
Species Act and Clean Air Act can discourage such activities.
On the whole, however, this analysis finds that the conflicts in
fire policy and management practices are few and relatively minor.
Where conflicts do exist, they are most commonly the result of inherent
complexity in fire-prone ecosystems that require some flexibility in
policy implementation. In the absence of reliable data to either support
or deny the claims that conflicting policies, excessive litigation, or
burdensome procedures are thwarting federal attempts to bring a
fuel/fire crisis under control, sweeping policy changes would be ill
advised at this time.
As was discussed briefly in the introduction, recent public
dialogue about environmental policy and fire management has tended to
support the idea that existing environmental policies often conflict with
the effective use of fire management strategies (including mechanical
thinning, fire use, and suppression). President George W. Bush and the
heads of several federal land management and environmental agencies
have repeatedly expressed pessimistic views on the applicability of
environmental policies to fire management. Given that these officials and
agencies are charged not only with the responsible management of
public lands but also with the implementation and enforcement of the
very policies they find "burdensome," these comments should be seen as
very real and serious criticism of federal environmental policy.
Similarly, despite a growing scientific and public consensus that
favors the reintroduction and extensive use of fire as a management tool,
the shift from fire suppression to fire use has been slow. If policy is not
inhibiting this shift, what is? In this article, I have explored the
possibility that the incentives of fire-relevant policies inherently
contradict one another and the principles of science-based management.
This analysis has shown that, while some contradictions do exist, they do
not appear to be unreasonably prohibitive to fire management activities.
In light of these questions, I propose three alternative analytical
conclusions, which are beyond the scope of this article and will require
much closer examination in future research.
One possible alternative is that some aspect of the implementtation of environmental policies may constrain or contradict good fire
management practices; the conflict may be not in the letter of the law but
in its implementation on the ground. One outstanding theme of the
policy debate has been that of administrative delays in the
implementation process. For example, some managers have argued that
the NEPA documentation process in particular is unreasonably lengthy
and time-consuming. Others argue that the citizen appeals and litigation
permitted under these laws are slowing implementation and interfering
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with fire management efforts. As with any policy, it may be that the
ground-level implementation of NEPA and ESA is significantly different
than what might be suggested by the policy document itself. Similarly, it
may be that the current fuels situation is such a crisis that agencies
simply do not have time to meet the procedural requirements of the laws
without further exacerbating the problem.
However, some initial evidence suggests that these conclusions
may be inaccurate. The CEQ regulations concerning NEPA implementtation clearly address issues of timeliness, and the CEQ allows agencies
to set time limits for each part of the NEPA process based on the
potential for harm, the magnitude of the action, the degree of
controversy, and other criteria. 70 A recent report from the non-partisan
General Accounting Office suggests that litigation has played only a
minor role in delaying hazardous fuels projects; of 762 fuels-related
decisions in fiscal years 2001 and 2002, only 180 were appealed (affecting
900,000 of a total 4.7 million acres) and only 23 were litigated (affecting
100,000 acres). 171 The same GAO report also found that 79 percent of
appeals were handled within the mandated 90-day period. Nonetheless,
these data address only a small portion of the implementation process.
Following the work of Aaron Wildavsky, future research is needed
concerning the on-the-ground realities of the implementation of
172
environmental policy in the fire management context.
A second alternative is that, as was previously suggested, the
formal incentives of policies are overshadowed by relatively obscure
budgetary incentives. Because fire suppression is funded through a
variety of channels, including emergency suppression funds funneled
from other agency activities, it is difficult to compare the increases in
funding for fire suppression to those for other, more effective fire
management activities. Nonetheless, this should prove an interesting
and productive topic for future researchers.
A final alternative is that the policy dialogue described here is
primarily or wholly a political construction. L. Earl Peterson, a Florida
state forester, began his welcome address to the 1995 Environmental
Regulation and Prescribed Fire Conference with what may be a telling
story:
170.
171.

40 CFR § 1501.8 (2005).
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., supra note 101, at 27.

172. See generally AARON WILDAVSKY, SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER: THE ART AND CRAFT
OF POLIcY ANALYSIS (1979); AARON WILDAVSKY & JEFFREY PRESSMAN, IMPLEMENTATION:
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AMAZING THAT FEDERAL PROGRAMS WORK AT ALL, THIS BEING A SAGA OF THE ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION AS TOLD BY TWO SYMPATHETIC OBSERVERS WHO SEEK TO
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During a skit on the Smothers Brother Show, Tommy
Smothers fell into a large vat of chocolate, and began to yell
"FIRE." When asked by his brother Dick why he yelled fire,
he responded, "well, do you think anyone would have
come if I had yelled 'CHOCOLATE'?"173
Recent criticism by some citizen groups has effectively accused
government agencies and the president of yelling "fire" instead of
"chocolate." The Sierra Club describes the Healthy Forests Initiative
as
"[ulsing the hype of the 2002 fire season" and "giv[ing] free reign to the
timber industry across National Forests under the guise of 'fuel
reduction.' " 174 Similarly, the Center for Biological Diversity argues that
the Healthy Forests Restoration Act is "the Bush Administration's push
to increase logging and decrease public participation in decisions that
affect our national forests." 175 Indeed, popular dialogue has made
wildland fire an increasingly sensitive and emotional subject, which in
turn makes it a good catchphrase for mobilizing support for new policies
and regulations. In the absence of reliable data to either support or deny
these claims, sweeping changes to administrative law should be
regarded with a great deal of skepticism.
Schneider and Ingram provide what may prove to be a useful
framework for evaluating the possible political construction of this
policy debate. 7 6 They describe a situation in which public policy design
has become increasingly hyperpoliticized; they argue that through the
political and social construction of oppositional target groups, "policies
deceive, confuse, and in other ways discourage active citizenship,
minimize the possibility of self-corrections, and perpetuate or exacerbate
the very tendencies that produced dysfunctional public policies in the
first place." 177 Because the debate described here is based on the
assumption that past fire policy has been dysfunctional, and because it is
rapidly evolving into new policy designs (for example, the Healthy
Forests Restoration Act), a unique opportunity exists to examine whether
the emerging federal fire policy is an example of hyperpoliticization.
There are some hints that this might be the case, especially in the new
173. E. Peterson, Welcome Address, in ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION & PRESCRIBED FIRE:
LEGAL AND SOCIAL CHALLENGES 6 (Proc., Envtl. Regulation & Prescribed Fire Conf., Mar
14-17, 1995).
174. Sierra Club, Debunking the "Healthy Forests Initiative," http://www.sierraclub.
org/forests/fires/healthyforests-initiative.asp (last visited Nov. 20, 2006).
175. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003: Fact Sheet as
of December, 2003, at 1, http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/swcbd/programs/forests/
hfi.pdf.
176.
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restrictions on citizen suits and reductions in transparency that have
developed from the fire debate.
If fire policy is a hyperpoliticized issue, academic analysis of its
implications has generally been depoliticized. However, a worthwhile
analysis of these policies should incorporate an explicit discussion of the
political and economic interests involved. If, as Schneider and Ingram's
framework suggests, the emerging wildland fire policies build different
incentives for different target groups, promote self-interested conflict
among constructed target groups, and show signs of subverting
democratic values, any further policy analysis should make explicit the
policy incentives for different stakeholders in fire management.
Exploring these critical research questions and issues in depth
will require substantial on-site work with federal land and resource
managers and fire planners and managers, but the issues addressed are
critical ones. Finding the exact points of contention between fire
management and environmental policy may allow policy makers to
solve those specific problems rather than undermining otherwise
effective legislation.

